Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541085

TOP SECRET

12 June 1961

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Copy No. ED 8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

(b)(3)

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541085

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541085

elections. He told the US air attaché that the CNU would continue to function but with no voice in military affairs. He noted that all CNU members would be allowed political careers following elections. Tansel claimed Madanoglu was on his way out and reiterated that the strength of the country now lay with the commanders of the military forces. When questioned regarding the status of the General Staff, Tansel remarked that it would function as before but under the control of the minister of defense.

The American Embassy tends to view Tansel's explanation as an oversimplification of the forces at work and believes there may well be more serious strains both within the CNU and within the armed forces.

Congo: Gizenga, secretly and through an intermediary, has presented a plan to UN Secretary General Hammarskjold under which representatives of Gizenga and Kasavubu would attempt to work out an agreed basis for a meeting of parliament and formation of a new government. He suggested Lulua-bourg as a possible site for such discussions. Gizenga agreed to consider the post of deputy premier for himself but insisted on parity with Kasavubu in the number of cabinet posts. Under Gizenga's proposal, Kasavubu would cease to act as chief of state until cleared of complicity in the death of Patrice Lumumba. Dissatisfied with the help he has received from the Soviet bloc, Gizenga reportedly said he was willing to "cut loose from them and throw in his lot with the real African nationalists." Kasavubu can be expected to resist the proposals for parity in the cabinet and restrictions on his powers. The United Nations, however, is likely to bring pressure to bear on Kasavubu to enter such negotiations.

Approved for Release: 2016/07/05 C06541085